# Debate 1 ## Proposition > "Preferences are gibberish" ## Argument | **Definiendum** | **Definiens** | |:-------------------------------------------:|:------------------------------------------------------- | | **P** | one's concept (x) is private | | **E** | others can have epistemic access to one's concept (x) | | **R** | a concept (x) can have a shared referent | | **M** | the concept (x) refers to material external to the mind | | **C** | a concept (x) can be communicated | | **p** | preference |
P1) One's concept is private if, and only if, others cannot have epistemic access to one's concept.
(∀x(Px↔¬Ex))
P2)
One's concept can have a shared referent if, and only if, one's concept refers to material external to the mind.
(∀x(Rx↔Mx))
P3)
One's concept can be communicated if, and only if, one's concept is not private and one's concept can have a shared referent.
(∀x(Cx↔¬Px∧Rx))
P4)
Others can not have epistemic access one's preferences.
(¬Ep)
P5)
One's preferences do not refer to material external to the mind.
(¬Mp)
C)
Therefore, one's preferences cannot be communicated.
(∴¬Cp)

[Proof Tree](https://www.umsu.de/trees/#(~6x(Px~4~3Ex)),(~6x(Rx~4Mx)),(~6x(Cx~4~3Px~1Rx)),(~3Ep),(~3Mp)|=(~3Cp)) ## Analysis 1) No clear reason to accept P1, P2, or P3 until the modality for possibility/impossibility is provided. 2) No clear reason to accept P4 or P5. They're just empirical claims. --- # Hashtags #debate #debate_opponents #clowns #clownery #philosophy #moral_subjectivism