# Debate 1
## Proposition
> "Preferences are gibberish"
## Argument
| **Definiendum** | **Definiens** |
|:-------------------------------------------:|:------------------------------------------------------- |
| **P** | one's concept (x) is private |
| **E** | others can have epistemic access to one's concept (x) |
| **R** | a concept (x) can have a shared referent |
| **M** | the concept (x) refers to material external to the mind |
| **C** | a concept (x) can be communicated |
| **p** | preference |
P1) One's concept is private if, and only if, others cannot have epistemic access to one's concept.
(∀x(Px↔¬Ex))
P2) One's concept can have a shared referent if, and only if, one's concept refers to material external to the mind.
(∀x(Rx↔Mx))
P3) One's concept can be communicated if, and only if, one's concept is not private and one's concept can have a shared referent.
(∀x(Cx↔¬Px∧Rx))
P4) Others can not have epistemic access one's preferences.
(¬Ep)
P5) One's preferences do not refer to material external to the mind.
(¬Mp)
C) Therefore, one's preferences cannot be communicated.
(∴¬Cp)
[Proof Tree](https://www.umsu.de/trees/#(~6x(Px~4~3Ex)),(~6x(Rx~4Mx)),(~6x(Cx~4~3Px~1Rx)),(~3Ep),(~3Mp)|=(~3Cp))
## Analysis
1) No clear reason to accept P1, P2, or P3 until the modality for possibility/impossibility is provided.
2) No clear reason to accept P4 or P5. They're just empirical claims.
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